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ABSTRACT 
In this article I discuss some aspects of prima facie statements and compare them with 
some deductive properties of moral rules. The conclusion I draw is in the sense of a re-
evaluation of some aspects of moral intuitionism, which seems essential to the concepts 
of moral imagination and moral education. 
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1. Usually, the moral principle “lying is prima facie wrong” is interpreted as 
a conditional statement, that is a statement which is true in the absence of 
further specifications. 1 Davidson has, however, proposed to interpret some 
statements, like those expressing moral principles, in a different way.2 In 
fact, while the first interpretation is commonly used in moral philosophy, in 
logical grammars the notion of prima facie does not apply to singular 
statements, but to couple of sentences. But as Davidson, together with Ar-
istotle, 3  stresses, the conclusion of a practical syllogism is not a sentence, 
                                                 
1 The notion of prima facie duties (duties of fidelity, reparation, justice and fairness, 
gratitude, beneficence, self-improvement, non-malfeasance) in ethics which here I take 
into account is that systematically set out by W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good, edited 
with an introduction, by Philip Stratton-Lake, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002 (1930, original edition), but I will not focus on his meta-ethical context or on his 
anti-naturalism. On intuitionism see the excellent collection edited by P. Stratton-Lake 
(ed.), Ethical Intuitionism. Re-evaluations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002. Ross, 
in this collection, P. Stratton-Lake, Pleasure and Reflection in Ross's Intuitionism, p. 
113-136.  
2 D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980, 
Essay 6, The Logical Form of Action Sentences. 
3 Aristotele, Nichomachean Ethics, 1147a-sgg. 
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but an action. So, the statement above should more correctly be translated 
into something like this: “if an act is prima facie a lie, this very fact makes 
it wrong.” 
This simple and seemingly trivial example reminds us that ethical re-
flection is always intended to be expressed as a kind of introduction to an 
action. This reminder is appropriate when we talk about rules, where there 
is the risk of overestimating the aids of formalization. This overestimation 
may inadvertently produce bad results that do not take into account what 
is a kind of primitive data, namely, that of our experience of people who 
meet other people is an action that takes place inside a reflection. The prob-
lematic character of moral action and ethical reflection is marked by the 
fact that these are performed inside the fragmentation of ethics, the plural-
ism of values, the so-called moral polytheism.  
These primitive data come along with another feature, potentially in 
tension with the first ones. It is this: while it is true that ethical reflection is 
at the service of the action and that our moral experience is frequently 
fragmented, 4 it is equally undeniable that we continually make use of moral 
rules in our thoughts, and in our actions, both in a posteriori justification of 
our past actions and of past actions of other agents. These rules sometimes 
seem to be significant enough to enter in the formulation of legislative de-
vices. 
As a matter of fact we can see a general emphasis on rules almost every 
day in newspaper and magazines. One reason is to be found in the new and 
not previously experienced importance of the life sciences, that can be po-
tentially relevant in the individual life of every person. This brings about a 
kind of general need for shared rules. A general emphasis of the rules is, 
however, at the same time, also a phenomenon akin to that of 
hypercodification,5 which affects all the liberal-democracies. In the middle 
of the ideology of deregulation and globalization, the ancient dream of the 
liberal state as just the night watchman of our rights, seems to have gone 
down, stunned or killed by the avalanche of legislative or quasi-legislative 
acts of national and super-national parliaments and bureaucracies. 6 
                                                 
4 On the origin of this fragmentation, see the classical analysis of Max Weber, The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: and Other Writings, Penguin, New York, 
2002. 
5 P. Prodi, Storia della giustizia, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000; P. Marrone, Un’introduzione 
alle teorie della giustizia, Mimesis, Milano, 2003. 
6 E. Todd, L’illusion économique, Gallimard, Paris, 2003. 
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It is not, however, essential to feel nostalgia for that dream or be unset-
tled by the contemporary phenomenon of hypercodification to return to 
question the function of moral rules. This is what I will do in the following 
pages, which are so much a review of some issues that the function of moral 
rules, in my opinion, raises in our lives and, sometimes, an attempt to pro-
vide occasional perspective suggestion to ethical research. 
However, something has survived of that function. What has been left 
to us like an ambiguous heritage is a call for coherence between different 
moral norms that can guide us, not without, sometimes, the perception that 
there may be chances for conflicts between different practical domains. The 
split between ethics and politics is one example. A similar problem of coher-
ence is reported by the idea of ’moral luck’ (your bad star has affected your 
life. Should this very fact guarantee a right for compensation? Does this call 
for compensation conflict with the idea of individual responsibility?) 7 and 
by the idea of ‘natural endowments’ (since your genetic heritage is not your 
responsibility, why should you be hold responsible for its consequences?). 
Consistency and coherence between different claims is often what is re-
quired to ethical reflection. 
Clearly, none of these difficulties is, however, a good reason to set aside 
hastily moral rules, general precepts, universal norms, because what is ex-
pressed in general rules is the existence of a relationship between certain 
properties and an event, relationship can be expressed in this way: “for all 
x, if there is y, then z”, where it is supposed that there is at least one prop-
erty which is relevant to the universality or generality of the practical sce-
nario. 8 
The main feature, although certainly not the only one, of moral rules is 
to be asserted in a plurality of cases - in the ideal case, this plurality asymp-
totically tends towards the universality -; from this feature a first im-
portant conclusion can be drawn, i.e. the independence of the purpose, or 
non-instrumentality of the rules. This feature may seem counter-intuitive. 
                                                 
7 On these problems see B. Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1981. 
8 It is necessary to distinguish between universal generalization and statistical generali-
zation. The first is an inductive generalization that applies to all the cases, the second 
applies to the majority of cases of a sample. On this problem that has to do with the va-
lidity of ceteris paribus norms, see the recent issue of Erkenntnis, vol. 57, 3 (2002), in 
particolare G. Schurz, “Ceteris Paribus Laws: Classification and Deconstruction”, pp. 
351-372. 
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The moral rules must still serve some purpose, otherwise why should we 
bother even to state them? Of course, all this is true, but the counter-
intuitive result is only apparent and become clear when we introduce the 
distinction between ‘incorporating a purpose in principle’ and ‘modeling a 
principle by a purpose’. 
When we act instrumentally, for example, maximizing our expected 
utility, according to some gradient of this utility, we act modeling a princi-
ple by a purpose. When we act in accordance with the principle prohibiting 
murder, we embed a purpose in our positive or omissive actions. This aim is 
also included in the exceptions to the rule, such as one that allows self-
defense. The rules have the potential, therefore, to be incorporated quite 
precisely on the background of specific cases, which represent the specific 
representation of the applicability of the standard. 9 
From these remarks I think that we should conclude that many prob-
lems of the so-called ‘meta-ethics’ are part of a different chapter than the 
generality or universality of moral norms. Issues related to the appropriate 
epistemological instruments that could possibly certify something about 
their metaphysical nature are independent of and subsequent to any attrib-
ution of universality or generality. From the logical form of a moral sen-
tence it cannot be analytically deduced nothing about its objectivist, realis-
tic, expressivistic, non-objectivist, non-realistic ontology. The only logical 
form is also totally inadequate to provide information and motivation on 
why the moral statement seems particularly persuasive, in agreement with 
our intuitions, with our prior knowledge, our experiences, or in agreement 
with other accepted moral statements (the statement ‘you should not dev-
astate the environment’ seems to have all these features, for example). But 
the logical form does not even seem to inform us if a statement is an exam-
ple of a universal generalization and accordingly without exception, or is, 
instead, a statistical generalization, that is, a statement which validity is 
asserted prima facie. The description of the logical form of a moral state-
ment is not a good instrument to understand the scope of applicability of 
some moral standard. 
 
 
                                                 
9 See P. Marrone, “Ragioni per l'azione, norme e contesto della scelta: riflessioni sull'uti-
lità attesa e sul conseguenzialismo”, Teoria, 2005, 1, pp. 93-116. 
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2. It is of course true that a prima facie moral statement requires examples 
that bring out the relevance of the case in relation to the rule, by which we 
can infer the relevant moral property of the action to be taken or omitted. 
What, however, is likely to remain concealed from this consideration is that 
if the exemplification discloses elements of the presence or absence of some 
moral property for the case in question, this happens because the reference 
of the moral statement is to the generality of a rule. The instantiation cre-
ates, in other words, a realistic presumption for the agent to believe that 
the relevant moral property is present or absent. 
It should be noted that this does not mean that we have a criterion to 
distinguish precisely between a good action (motivated, that is, by a good 
intention) and the goodness of an action. This distinction is particularly im-
portant to show how ethical reflection is nurtured by both abstraction 
(norms, rules, universal and statistical generalizations) and necessary em-
pirical investigations. Let us clarify this point with an example. If I am a 
philanthropist who launched an aid program for poor families of farmers in 
Mali (admittedly one of the poorest countries on the planet), which includes 
food and medical aids, who would deny that I am actually doing a good 
deed? But if I can get a basic idea of the causes of poverty of farmers in Ma-
li (which are mainly cotton producers), which is commonly believed to be 
brought about by subsidized agricultures of the richest countries in the 
world (notably, the United States and the European Union), preventing the 
development of the poorest areas in sub-Saharan Africa, then, while this 
more complete knowledge does not affect the moral quality of my action, I 
should begin to have doubts about the actual goodness of this specific  ac-
tion in the medium and long time. 10 
On the one hand, it is easy to identify the fundamental moral quality 
guiding my action - trying to ease the burden of unwarranted human suffer-
ing -; from another, it is necessary an empirical recognition for making my 
intention as deep and good as possible. Resting on an exclusively epistemo-
                                                 
10 The issue of charity is currently very complicated due to the emergence of an exten-
sive marketing of goodness, which sometime reflects the holistic ideology of the competi-
tive market. See the examples in J. Bakan, The Corporation: the pathological pursuit of 
profit and power, Free Press, New York, 2004. 
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logical reading of the prima facie statement clearly does not capture what 
the ethical statement is aimed at. 
It is true that the relevant moral properties that are believed to be in-
corporated into a good action make right our good intention (if I am a per-
son who keeps his promises, the quality of the actions arising from my 
keeping promises is confirmed and increased, not decreased by my keeping 
promises), but this until it collides with considerations of greater weight, 
which, usually, are structured in a complex empirical dimension. This is ba-
sically the reason why morality (both moral inquiry and moral action) is 
both a product of idealization and of empirical recognition. If a moral norm 
cannot be instantiated into an example, then it is doubtful that it has a real 
value for us. 
For this reason, I think it is correct to say that a moral norm can play a 
twofold role. One role is epistemic and  investigative and it is about the crit-
ical awareness that the agent may have reached about the depth of a 
standard, that is, its applicability to a variety of non-trivially similar cases, 
and about its complexity, i.e. its capability to relate to other standards in a 
rational and hierarchical structure. This is definitely one of the main tools 
for an agent to evaluate alternative options even when - or maybe especial-
ly when – they are not clearly opposite. An awareness for the function of 
the standards can be useful as a counterweight to a certain, so to speak, fri-
gidity of the rules, i.e. the fact that griping too close to the rules debar a se-
cond role, that is the ability to modulate moral sentence within the power 
of our moral imagination. Moral imagination is the ability  which protects 
us from the moral severity, bringing us back to our of human frailty. Imag-
ination (the ability to imagine ourselves in hypothetical situations) has a 
clear link  with the complexity of the moral life and it is not a coincidence 
that this function has been most successfully described mainly by artists ra-
ther than by philosophers and legislators.11  
 
 
3. It is not, however, on this last important role that I mean to focus, but 
rather on one thing, which I will call ‘truthfulness’, played by moral norms, 
i.e. the capability to highlight the truth of some moral conclusions. There 
are various models which are compatible with this idea. One of these could 
                                                 
11 On the role of imagination in moral education see M. Nussbaum Poetic Justice, New 
York, Houghton Mifflin, 1996. 
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be a deductive model that requires that every singular statement of an ethi-
cal system is produced by the conjunction of a general moral norm with a 
description of a proper case. The purpose of the general norm is to highlight 
a fundamental property related to the moral dimension; the purpose of the 
proper case is to show that this property is present in the action that is tak-
en into consideration. 
Another model, the intuitionist model of D. Ross, based on the role of 
prima facie statements, tells us a different story. According to Ross, singu-
lar judgments cannot always be deduced from the conjunction of a moral 
standard and a specific case, since they may not always receive their deon-
tic character from this conjunction. However, the morality of an action de-
pends solely on the fact that it incorporates some fundamental property 
that is part of a prima facie valid norm.12 These properties, unequivocally, 
create a certain emotional tone, which helps to form the presumption of 
their validity, but may be overshadowed and overwhelmed by different 
constellations of fundamental properties. 
Does this kind of intuitionism justify skepticism about the rules? Often, 
I have heard the following example from advocates of the various forms of 
skepticism about the rules (with the obvious intention of épater les philoso-
phes). Consider the valid prima facie statement “it is immoral to kill ba-
bies.” We know that civilizations different from ours seemed to contradict 
the prima facie validity of this statement. How a skeptic would argue about 
this example? Probably, saying that different constellations of property 
were relevant for different agents. 
I do not think, however, that this is the last word that can be offered in 
this regard. In fact, one can argue that it is not the prima facie validity of 
the statement to be questioned, but rather the conditions of identification 
to apply it to the fundamental properties of the relevant cases. It seems to 
be quite clear that in some culture some physical deformations excluded 
some infants from the category of ‘normal infants’ (infants, that is, that 
presumably could develop into ‘normal human beings’). It is not, therefore, 
the prima facie validity of the statement to be challenged, but rather the 
                                                 
12 Co W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good, “I suggest ‘prima facie duty’ or ‘conditional 
duty’ as a brief way of referring to the characteristic (quite distinct from that of being a 
duty proper) which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind (e.g. the keeping of a 
promise), of being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of 
another kind which is morally significant.” (p. 19). 
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normativity of the concept of ‘normal infant’ and of the concept of ‘belong-
ing to the human species’. We think with many good reasons, both scien-
tific and moral ones, that we have a more complete concept of ‘human be-
ing’ such that we must reject those practices. In rejecting them, we do not 
do nothing but reaffirming the validity of the prima facie statement, assum-
ing that it has never really been rejected by anyone in a well-founded way.13 
This exemplification is not a general refutation of skepticism about the 
rules, but it shows its inadequacy in a relevant particular case. 
For the intuitionist it remains true that, regardless of the constellations 
of moral meanings that come into play in our judgments, prima facie judg-
ments fulfill an important function in identifying relevant features from the 
moral point of view. These characteristics are important because they can 
be subsumed under a rule that identifies the property and/or moral princi-
ples to which those characteristics are reported. The difference with the 
first model is that in the second this subsumption is intrinsically problemat-
ic and contingent. The important thing in my opinion is that it is not essen-
tial to be an intuitionists to think that prima facie judgments may actually 
be an important instrument to identify the validity of a particular moral 
statement. 
Therefore, it would be wrong to identify the second model with a theory 
that, in the end, does nothing but warn that the likely outcome of the sup-
posed validity of prima facie statements is a recurrent relativism, which 
drowns them in the vortex of increasingly specific constellations of different 
and potentially incompatible moral meanings, how the skeptic states. In 
fact, such sentences have a range of applicability (prima facie, indeed) very 
large, because, in extreme cases, they can be applied in all ethically relevant 
cases, identifying a property as essential. This idea is emphatically incorpo-
rated in the generality of the standard. 
As a matter of fact, there may be features of the world that can become 
ethically relevant in certain socio-economic contexts, without being in any 
way covered by prima facie sentences, even when, for various reasons, we 
are led to believe that the statements, that they express, are instead prima 
facie. For example, the statement “it is morally correct to pursue good gov-
ernance” is ethically insignificant. While its being insignificant may be a 
good reason for being continually repeated by politicians, it is not, however, 
a reason for a specific moral thickness. Assessing it without many further 
                                                 
13 J. Bennett, “The necessity of Moral Judgment”, Ethics, 1993, 103, pp. 458-472. 
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specifications does not help us at all in choosing whether it should be ethi-
cally preferred a policy of expansion of public spending or cuts in govern-
ment services or whether it is ethically justified the intrusion of interna-
tional organizations in the political economics of a nation. Any hope of un-
derstanding such complex issues requires an extensive discussion both of 
ideas and empirical analysis that the general sentence can neither give nor 
suggest. 
This also applies to other statements that are not prima facie but that 
have acquired an axiomatic value in certain contexts. Moreover, some of 
these actually identify basic moral properties. I am thinking about some 
statements that for us, citizens of the affluent society have this axiomatic 
quality, such as: ‘democracy is the best system that promotes justice: it is 
therefore an ethical duty to promote it’,  or ‘political democracy is the sys-
tem that best promotes personal freedom: it is therefore an ethical duty to 
promote it.’ With regard to the first, it can be said that there is no analyti-
cal link between democracy and justice, but just a synthetic bond, subject 
to all the contingencies of the empirical linkages. With regard to the latter, 
it suffices to say that in plebiscitary democracy, such as many of the West-
ern liberal-democratic political systems, the formal structure of political 
participation is overwhelmed by the immense amount of money needed to 
support the political machines of the candidates. I believe there is not any-
one so naive as to think that bringing into play of immense resources has 
the purpose to foster the personal freedom of individuals. Even what we ac-
cept as axioms of our civil life, axioms that should, in some way, epitomize 
the ethical depth of our political systems are quite empty.14 If they identify 
some fundamental properties (‘personal freedom’, ‘person’) this is done in 
conjunction with empirical cases, while it is not clear at all that the rule can 
show us the way in which this should be done. It goes without saying that 
these last two examples may apply only if you have been already persuaded 
that the distinction between morals (which would deal with private cases) 
and ethics (which would deal with public behaviors) cannot exhibit but 
weak reasons to be justified. 
                                                 
14 That the link between the rise of personal freedom, the concept of personal dignity 
and an endowment of rights is just formal, is the position held by the young Marx. Si 
veda K. Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Prometheus Books, 
1988 (Oeconomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844 in Marx-Engels 
Gesamtausgabe, vol. III, Frakfurt a. M. – Moskau, 1932).  
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4. But how the identification of relevant moral rules could set out correct 
procedures for the identification of specific moral cases? Emphasizing how 
to derive particular statements by general rules, do deductive models have 
less difficulties than the intuitionist approaches based on prima facie state-
ments? In a sense, the answer is positive, because the need to bring together 
the particular statements with the general rules does not lead to consider 
the discovery of constellations of meanings that may cast doubt on the 
identification of general rule or fundamental properties a final result which 
can be reached, but a problematic and momentary outcome which calls into 
question our best knowledge of our best available empirical and theoretical 
models. 
It is true that rely too heavily on the virtues of the practical syllogism 
can lead to a conservative intellectual attitude. This attitude can hinder the 
identification of new morally relevant cases or particularly complex cases, 
or even cases of moral dilemma. The individuation of a chain of argument 
(which traditionally identifies ethical argumentation with practical syllo-
gism) does not provide greater certainty of existence of a moral property, 
but rather certifies a commitment towards moral discussion and truth. 
While the outline of a comprehensive moral order, is, however, out of place 
for an ethical thinking that feeds on experience, this is not a good reason to 
give up the search for an intellectual order. 
On the contrary, it is quite true that a model based on prima facie 
statements incurs more easily in a drawback of this kind because, while it 
identifies basic moral properties with greater ease, it does not provide spe-
cific tools to relate our moral intuitions to the special cases. If we are lucky, 
this can happen, but the idea that the prima facie sentence is not the major 
premise of a syllogism leads inevitably to think that each conclusion could 
be thorough enough to be put in disagreement with the prima facie state-
ment. 
This does not mean, however, that prima facie statements does not of-
ten play an important role in everyday life. Reporting a shared heritage, in 
fact, is a cognitive practice at least as important as ethically reasoning. 
Prima facie statements are aimed at to this shared ethical assets. The ad-
vantages, from my point of view, are of two kinds: assuming some prima fa-
cie statement usually shortens discussion, and we do not always have suffi-
cient time to discuss; besides, through shared ethical beliefs the noise, so to 
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speak, in the communication channel is greatly reduced. The risks are not 
necessarily minor and should not be underestimated, because the disad-
vantage of this model is the possibility of conformism and fanaticism. For 
this reasons, a prima facie statement is rarely conclusive in an ethical dis-
cussion. 
The two models that have been outlined, however different and com-
peting, share an important theoretical core, namely the idea that it is possi-
ble to identify morally relevant elements from non-moral characteristics. 
We, in fact, do not blame a praying mantis eating the head of the male dur-
ing copulation. Instead we blame the jealous wife who emasculates her hus-
band. It is the attribution of certain characteristics, relevant from a moral 
point of view (intentionality, responsibility, intelligence, and so on) that al-
lows the ascription of moral characteristics to  a human actions and not to 
mutilation performed by a praying mantis. 
This position seems to be plausible for both models, but there are some 
who claims that, on the contrary, no rule is able to identify morally rele-
vant features in action by no moral features. The conclusion is that there 
are no rules that identify ethically relevant properties, because the empiri-
cal circumstances of every action prevent us from identifying fundamental 
not moral properties.15 
Let us consider the prescription of abstaining from getting directly or 
indirectly pain to someone. Since we can easily imagine situations that vio-
late this prima facie rule, then the rule has no value and no significance, 
since it does not allow discrimination between relevant and not relevant 
cases. The oncologist should refrain from prescribing immunosuppressive 
therapies, which often cause pain to the patient, and limit to the admin-
istration of the most potent available analgesics; the police should limit its 
action to a benevolent reproach, instead of removing points from your drive 
license for dangerous driving; the legal systems should not provide punish-
ment. The conclusion is that the rules are not prima facie rules because they 
do not allow us to identify anything. And since the operation of identifica-
                                                 
15 On particularism see J. Dancy, “On Moral Properties”, Mind, 1981, pp. 367-385; J. 
Dancy, “Ethical Particularism”, Mind, 1983, pp. 530-547; J. Dancy, Moral Reasons, 
Balckwell, Oxford, 1992; S. Kirchin, “Particularism, Generalism and the Counting Ar-
gument”, European Journal of Philosophy, 2003, pp. 54-71; J. Dancy, “Contro le ragioni 
basate sui desideri”, Ragion pratica, 2003, pp. 189-208 e B. Celano, “In difesa delle 
ragioni basate sui desideri”, Ragion pratica, 2003, pp. 209-232. 
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tion and re-identification is what allows the cognitive strategy of showing 
fundamental properties, then these properties do not exist.  
 
 
5. This strategy, which emphasizes the indefinite variety of moral cases 
and, ultimately, the fragmentation of our ethical life, however, relies on 
something truly present in our experience, which actually takes place and 
becomes operational through a particular context. However, this fact, tak-
en by itself, does not prove the conclusion that the skeptics is talking about, 
that our experience is only a singular experience. An analogy with percep-
tion can help here: even our perceptual experiences, by the very fact of be-
ing experiences, are contextual, but our perceptual experience is singularly 
compact and filled with invariance that, usually, make our present experi-
ence a good instrument to give credit to for our future experiences.16 The 
singularity of the elements of the experience does not mean fragmentation 
and loss of the unity of experience.  
Let us consider the case of lying. The ethically negative value of  lying 
depends on the positive value we attach to the truth. Truth, according to 
common sense, allows us to see things as they are; we can assess the reliabil-
ity of other people evaluating their leaning to tell the truth; we can evalu-
ate our willingness to cooperate with others on this leaning. But it happen 
that we lie and we do not always experience lying as clearly immoral behav-
ior. The mother tells the child that his recently died father has gone on a 
long journey: certainly she is not telling the truth. Or let us think about 
someone who defends his homeland from an invader, and captured by the 
enemy, lies on the identity of his companions. All these behaviors are not 
truthful, but how they question the morality of the prima facie rule “you 
must tell the truth (or at least what we consider to be such)?” The rule re-
mains true in a presumptive way (prima facie, indeed) and counter-
examples do not show at all that there is nothing ethically significant in 
telling the truth, but rather show that there are cases where the importance 
of telling the truth can be placed in the background, without acting immor-
ally. 
By its very nature the position that insists on the structural particular-
ity of our moral experience cannot tell us how to select the cases in which 
                                                 
16 R. Nozick, Invariances, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, (Mass.), 2003; M. Fer-
raris, Mondo esterno, Bompiani, Milano, 2001. 
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truth-telling can be overshadowed. Take, switching to another example, a 
behavior exhibiting solidarity. It is certainly good to show solidarity, but to 
whom? I can be sympathetic to the members of my mafia gang or to a 
friend who usually performs pedophilia. These are certainly not morally 
praiseworthy behaviors. It must be concluded, therefore, that solidarity is 
highly contextual and that therefore there is no prima facie obligation to 
solidarity? I think that these examples miss the point. What they show is 
not so much the absence of a prima facie rule that requires the attitude of 
solidarity, but rather the absence of any clause of specification in the gen-
eral statement as it has been formulated. Moreover, these examples are in 
no way in conflict with the fact that intuition can actually be one of the cri-
teria to guide the decision. They just prove that in most cases the intuition 
cannot be the only criterion. 
These examples are by no means conclusive, because there is still some-
thing we need to understand. Do they refer to moral properties which value 
is variable or to certain fundamental properties which value is always the 
same, but that have been overwhelmed by other properties morally most 
significant? In other words, can we be sure that some form of solidarity 
with a friend who is guilty of immoral behavior cannot have anything good 
in itself? The possibilities of analysis are more than one, for example: a) it 
could be argued that solidarity is a good thing only if it leads to good con-
sequences and if it is part of a general set of good plans, or, b) it could be 
said that solidarity does not always lead to good consequences. In the latter 
case, what should be said is that a property is inherently relevant from the 
moral point of view only if all its applications are relevant in the same way. 
Since it is not so for the solidarity, then the conclusion should be that it is 
not a property inherently relevant and significant. 
What makes relevant a morally significant quality? I believe it is not 
only the fact that the moral value of the action in which it exhibit itself 
immediately results from its incarnation into action. The properties of the 
action are subject to different and gradual evaluation and the same applies 
to morally relevant qualities, but many people think that a positive moral 
evaluation of an action, which incorporates values such as solidarity, gener-
osity, telling-the-truth, is self-evident. If we agree with this assumption, it 
does not follow that we should deny that these values are subject to excep-
tions of a certain context, as it does not follow that since the exceptions 
stemming from the context actually exist, then those values are not moral-
ly relevant properties. In other words, exceptions to the moral rules do not 
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mean that the behavior we assume as morally relevant is meaningless: en-
joying the undeserved misfortune of a fellow creature is always morally 
wrong; killing for fun, too. Why? Because we believe that these actions are 
void of morally significant justifications. This can be said without engaging 
in strictly deontic considerations. Those who deny the existence of any 
moral rule, of course, deny the existence of any similar feature in the evalu-
ation of similar actions. 
However, we must admit that affirming the existence of rules is one 
thing and  saying that these rules are able to identify and define precisely 
sets of morally relevant elements in similar cases is another. Defining a set 
of morally relevant elements is a task close to that of creating borders. The-
se boundaries in ethics are moral rules that identify ethically relevant char-
acteristics, and properties are morally relevant if they can be shown in a 
particular case. The falsification of the idea of rules as creators of borders is 
not a simple task. It is not enough to be able to point out a single case in 
which the moral relevance of the property in question is uncertain and/or 
subject to exceptions.  
 
 
6. Our moral environment is, in fact, inherently complex, adaptive to our 
needs, and involve the use of tools of reasoning with degrees of flexibility 
and sensitivity to the context of the choices: these are all elements that 
make a project of ethics limited to particular cases highly implausible and, 
in fact, even those who are suspicious of an ethics tightly bound to general 
prima facie statements, think that an excessive specification - proper 
names, indexicals, definite descriptions - cannot distinguish their position 
from moral particularism. 
A moral strategy that is sensitive to the context of application is there-
fore not really a strategy that calls into question the general ethics, be-
cause, while we can assume that the relevant moral properties are sensitive 
to the context and at the same time are relevant in a diversified manner, we 
can also continue to maintain that special cases are meaningful only if they 
can be traced back to relevant properties. For example, the wickedness of a 
murderer is explained by its relationship with the evil of murder in general. 
If we assume that the judgment on the particular evil of a particular mur-
der is due solely to some other character, different from the intrinsic evil of 
murder, then we should abandon the possibility of an explanation through 
moral principles (this would be possible, for example, if we would subscribe 
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a strict behavioral determinism, which makes impossible the very idea of 
moral action). 
It is of course true that situations and people are in some ways unique. 
This condition is expressed by the possibility of giving definite descriptions. 
You could also say that this is precisely what happens when we begin to 
recognize that the context should help to determine our moral sensibilities. 
However, the idea of moral particularist of a sui generis ethical relevance of 
the context is, at present, somewhat mysterious and might not have any 
explanatory power. Of course, the particularist can object that the particu-
lar context of the action is a kind of brute fact, and that those who conceive 
of the moral rules such as what surround the validity of our judgments and 
rely on this picture to falsify particularism simply assume the thesis to be 
proved. 
Particularism violates the principle of economy that is characteristic of 
every good theory or model. The problem is that it is not enough to ad-
vance this last observation to settle the issue. If it is quite reasonable to 
contemplate exceptions to moral rules, how many of these exceptions can 
be tolerated in order to  preserve the superiority of the explaining theory 
over particularism? Is it conceivable that these exceptions can also be a 
significant number. But how many exactly should be without being too 
many? We are not in possession of a method that will show us an ideal 
number of exceptions. The only plausible rule is this: that the map should 
look like the land, but cannot picture the territory in all its details, other-
wise it would identify with this. It is intuitive that if an explanation takes 
us back to the problem of the limited exceptions, however a certain explan-
atory vagueness does not render the particularistic position stronger, be-
cause this would be true if no moral fact (together with its context) could 
never be considered as an example of a general rule, a position that is in fact 
false. 
The idea of general moral rules as a means of delimitation seems to me 
particularly valuable both from the point of view of its use in common 
sense and from the point of view of moral epistemology. But how general 
rules are able to specify particular conclusions? The situation is not clear. 
When are identified by a single prima facie rule, morally relevant properties 
do not arise considerable problems; but what happens when there are dif-
ferent prima facie rules at stake? Must we conclude that prima facie rules 
are not able of determining specific moral conclusions? If we give a positive 
response, we accept the underlying idea that the relevance of the prima fa-
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cie rules may vary so deeply, depending on the actual circumstances, that 
they are no longer rules. Or, since we are not able to know in advance what 
is the relative weight of each of the prima facie rules in competition, we 
must be willing to go beyond to some higher rule, for example some abso-
lute moral rule. Or, again, we can maintain that prima facie rules can de-
termine specific moral conclusions, without any need for absolute rules or 
additional insights, but then we must also be willing to put our prima facie 
rules in a lexicographical order. 
Some solutions could come from a order in which to every rule is as-
signed a different numerical value. Thus a rule with a lower numerical value 
could, in certain circumstances, exceed the value of a rule with a higher 
value, because it would be in conjunction with other rules and their total 
value would be superior. This method reduces the uncertainty in the con-
clusions, and it seems to approximate to how we take decisions in some ac-
tual circumstances in real life, for example in situations which seem to in-
volve ethical dilemmas. The problem is that we are not in possession of a 
method to decide what the numerical values could represent. Degrees of sat-
isfaction, perhaps? A ordering of prima facie rules by another criterion? 
Why should we suppose that this ordering is fixed? Should we consider our-
selves bound to the numerical value of a prima facie rule prescribing to tell 
the truth more than to a prima facie rule prescribing some kind of solidari-
ty? The idea of a numeric representation of fixed prima facie rules appears 
to be very unlikely, although it is true that when rules are in conflict with 
each other we try to assess their relative weight. But this brings us back to 
the first objection, namely that a system of prima facie rules seem to be just 
a step in moral deliberation. 
 
 
7. An alternative solution to this situation of uncertainty is represented by 
various monistic systems. For these systems the general condition is that 
exists a fundamental value which must be maximized. This value can be 
love for God or avoiding pain or achieving pleasure or promoting the inter-
ests of the nation, or preserving the rights of individuals. To embrace a 
monism of this kind is necessary to be convinced that any value is derivable 
from a single source, through various intermediate steps. But this seems to 
be false. The value of friendship seems that cannot be stemmed from the 
same source of the value of knowledge. The value of solidarity, meant as re-
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spect for the humanity of a person, cannot be stemmed from the value that 
is attributed to our own professional association. 
Suppose, for example, that the supreme value from which the others 
can be stemmed from is pleasure. Certainly, knowledge can usually provide 
to the person who know a kind of pleasure, but how can we be sure that the 
result of every cognitive act will be directly derived from that supreme val-
ue? After all, we can also get to hear unpleasant things (this is one of the 
consequences of the motto sapere aude). Scientists work keeping in mind the 
possible confirmation of their hypothesis, but they can come across with 
facts which falsify their expectations. It is hard to believe that the process 
of falsification generates pleasure. Something similar can occur in everyday 
life. For example, you may have based the relationship with your partner 
on the sincerity and openness. Nonetheless, one day you discover that your 
partner has been involved for years in a parallel affair with that neighbor 
you hate. Clearly, this cognitive revelation will not make you happy. The 
moral monism does not recognize, therefore, that there are values that are 
irreducible and does not provide a method for selecting preferences in ac-
cordance with the supreme value. 
Perhaps a constructivist approach could prove more flexible in order to 
defend some kind of ethics of rights, 17 which are probably the most promis-
ing candidate from this point of view, because it allow to articulate many 
ethical behavior, while maintaining the unavailability of the ethical first 
principles. Even though for this system too remains valid Nozick’s 
                                                 
17 The main sources of the debate on constructivism are two: N. Goodman, Facts, Fic-
tions, and Forecasts, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, (Mass.), 1983, and J. Rawls, 
Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, pp. 89-129. On con-
structivism see also, O. Hill & E. Thomas, “Hypothetical Consent in Kantian Construc-
tivism”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 2001, pp. 300-329; R. Wedgwood, “Practical Rea-
soning As Figuring Out What Is Best: Against Constructivism”, Topoi, 2002, pp. 139-
152; E. Watkins & W. Fitzpatrick, “O’Neill and Korsgaard on the Construction of Nor-
mativity”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 2003, pp. 349-367; P. Stemmer, “Moralische 
Rechte als soziale Artefakte”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 2002, pp. 673-691; T. 
Magri, “Freres Ennemis. The Common Root of Expressivism and Constructivism”, To-
poi, 2002, pp.153-164; C. Lafont, “Realismus und Konstruktivismus in der kant-
ianischen Moralphilosophie: das Beispiel der Diskursethik”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Phi-
losophie, 2002, pp. 39-52; O. O’Neil, “Constructivism in Rawls and Kant” in S. Freeman 
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2003, pp. 347-367.  
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objecton,18 that is, what to do when a “catastrophic moral horror”  can be 
avoided only with a violation of the basic principles of the ethical system?19  
Many provisions are likely to be deficient from the point of view of in-
formation, reproducing at a different level the same defect which were in-
tended to prevent. We can certainly try to specify them further, but this 
may just be one more problem for an ethics of rights. I.e., you are a cop sin-
cerely convinced of the sanctity of rights. You and your mates have cap-
tured a man suspected to concoct a terroristic attack.  You have a reasona-
ble suspicion that the plan for the attack is in an advanced stage of imple-
mentation. You have the prospect of saving lives, if you are able to get the 
right information in a short time, but the suspect does not speak and say he 
knows nothing on a possible attack. How much are you willing to push for-
ward with the interrogation techniques? Are you willing to give a couple of 
slaps to the suspect? And if these do not work? Are you willing to break his 
arm? Or to amputate it? You decide to practice a moderate level of physical 
persuasion, involving beatings, but no permanent physical damage. Even-
tually the suspect results unrelated to the preparation of the attack, which, 
in the meantime, has been performed and did not cause any victim, but on-
ly property damage. 
Were you justified in torturing the suspect? The attack could have 
brought about  much more damage killing many lives. Moreover, you were 
in good faith and really thought that the suspect was involved in the prepa-
ration of the attack and was able to provide useful information for prevent-
ing it. How precise must be any information in such cases to proceed to an 
interrogation that violates the rights of the suspect? How serious must be 
the possible attack? How precise must be your notion of moral catastrophe 
                                                 
18 R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Book, New York, 1974, p. 30; for issues 
realated see also: T, Nagel, “War and Massacre”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1972, 
pp. 123-144; R. Brandt, “Utilitarianism and the Rules of War”, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 1972, pp. 145-165, M. Walzer, Just and Unjust War, Basic Book, New York, 
1977. 
19 It is a issue akin of that of deterrence. T. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard 
University Press,Cambridge (Mass.), 19802; G. Kavka, Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deter-
rence, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1987; R. Festa, “Minacce e promesse: lo-
gica e metodologia della deterrenza”, in G. Mangnaro Favaretto (ed.), La guerra: una ri-
flessione interdisciplinare, Edizioni Università di Trieste, Trieste, 2003, pp. 247-298 e R. 
Festa, “Teoria dei giochi e strategie della deterrenza”, Logic & Philosophy of Science, 
2004, 
http://www.univ.trieste.it/episteme/L&PS_Vol2No1/contents_L&PS_Vol2No1.htm. 
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to venture further on the dark side of the violation of the person? It is clear 
that in such a situation, unless you and your colleagues are sadistic cops, 
you experience a genuine dilemma.20 
The problem which is highlighted by examples of this kind is that we 
are not in possession of all necessary rules to answer to these last three 
questions. Filling in a list with many cases does not solve the problem, be-
cause neither you have any guarantee that the list is exhaustive nor you 
can know a priori that it takes into consideration all relevant cases, alt-
hough a list of cases helps to reduce the uncertainty. 
Perhaps it is not necessary, however, to charge the ethical absolutism 
with the accusation of hypocrisy, when it can be shown that at least some 
of its behaviors can be driven by fanaticism. Where does this potential fa-
naticism stem from? You can trace it back from the belief that every moral 
conclusion and every action are determined by an absolute rule. This mod-
el, conceiving of moral properties as fully determinative of the contexts of 
action, is in fact incompatible with a prima facie model. If we were in pos-
session of an exhaustive set of absolute moral rules there should not be 
more space for the prima facie rules, that we could not even consider as im-
perfect epistemic guides for action. As a matter of fact, moral properties are 
determinative of the contexts in a variable way. Usually aggressive actions 
against a fellow human being that are not performed for self-defense are 
sufficient index of cruel behavior, although, perhaps, not of an inherent 
cruelty of the agent. If a person donates the most part of his wealth to char-
ity institutions, this is usually considered as an index of a generous attitude, 
but things can be explained otherwise. Causing the death of a child elicits a 
reaction of indignation, but if your child is suffering from an incurable form 
of cancer and you are to administer a large doses of morphine to ease his 
unbearable pain, knowing that the outcome will be a respiratory arrest, 
then things need to be considered from a different perspective - that for 
someone calls into play the doctrine of double effect. But this means that 
some properties, which you cannot actually deny as determinative of ethi-
cal judgments, are not always able to determine the moral conclusions we 
would like, because we are in the presence of an ethical salience that it is 
hardly deniable. 
                                                 
20 A. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the 
Challenge, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2003. 
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Ethical monism is not able to sketch a comprehensive set of absolute 
rules, while it cannot refute the idea that there are salient ethical properties 
that are drawed  by variable contexts.  
The consequences that should be drawn from this phenomenology are 
important from the epistemological point of view and from the point of 
view of ontology of morals. Should we think that some practical conclusions 
are not deductible by rules? Would it follow a  devastating epistemological 
skepticism on ethics? I thinks that it depends on how we justify the idea 
that we have access to moral facts that undermine ethical absolutism. Stat-
ing that our access to certain moral facts is not inferential, but that it is in 
accordance with some other beliefs, is in contrast with the characteristics 
that usually is attached to not inferential knowledge. Indeed, the validity 
of a justified belief that allows the conclusion of the practical syllogism is 
not an analytically true knowledge. Otherwise, thinking that justification is 
inductive does not give to ethical exceptions the place that must be given to 
them to describe more fully our ethical experience. The only other possible 
strategy seems to me to move towards a kind of coherentism.21 The underly-
ing idea is that it is not sufficient to establish the existence of some difficult 
cases or exceptions for collapsing the system of rules. So, while consistency 
remains one of the goals of the justification of rules, this happens without 
refusing the intuitive reliability of particular cases. 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 E. Baccarini, “Rational Consensus and Coherence Methods in Ethics”, Grazer Philoso-
phisce Studien, 1991, pp. 151-159; S. Klein, “The Value of Endoxa in Ethical Argu-
ment”, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 1992, pp.141-157; R. Ebertz, “Is Reflective 
Equilibrium a Coherentist Model?”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1993, pp. 193-214; 
E. Stein, “Rationality and Reflective Equilibrium”, Synthese, 1994, pp. 137-172; K. 
Nielsen, “Methods of Ethics: Wide Reflective Equilibrium and a Kind of Consequential-
ism”, Journal of Social Philosophy, 1994, pp. 57-72; N. Daniels, “Justice and Justifica-
tion: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice”, Zeitschrift für philosophische For-
schung, 1998, pp. 332-336; N. Daniels, “Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium 
in Theory and Practice”, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 1998, pp. 332-336; B. 
Gaut, “Justifying Moral Pluralism” in P. Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-
evaluations, pp. 137-160; R. Miller, “Without Intuitions”, Metaphilosophy, 2000, pp. 231-
250; T. Scanlon, “Rawls on Justification” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, S. 
Freeman, Samuel (ed), cit., pp. 139-167. 
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8. What coherentism suggest is the importance of sensibility for correcting 
our judgments. Indeed, there is also a fetishism of the rules as well as skep-
ticism about rules - expressed by the paradox of Wittgenstein that any fact 
can be put in an agreement with a rule.22 Using intuition does not mean 
that we abandon the possibility of justification, since the function of moral 
rules is not the development of moral sensitivity, but the support to our 
moral sensitivity once it has already formed. This sensitivity is probably in-
compatible with some forms of nominalism, i.e. positions that deny the ex-
istence of moral universal. This may lead us to re-evaluate a position as 
Ross’s intuitionism that claimed the possibility of ethical universal, with-
out having to rely on the constant possibility of deducing each moral fact 
by general or universal rules. 
The belief that there are no rules which can cover the totality of our 
ethical experience can be questioned by at least two considerations: a) the 
first is simply that the ethical life is not necessarily meant to generate more 
certainty. Living ethically means, increasingly, also living within a kind of 
risk. The ethical risk is both the possibility of failure and the possibility of 
crossing the weakness of our own will - as well as that of others -, as well as 
the possibility of moral dilemma and the possibility to meet some delibera-
tions of other people which do not agree with ours. The rules are an aid, but 
cannot be the solution to the risk of ethical life, as it cannot be intuition, 
which indefinite extension leads to fanaticism. We need to reconcile both 
the need of an order, expressed by the rules, and the moral phenomenology 
of concrete cases, and the ethical heritage expressed by our best intuitions; 
b) the second is the difficulty of indicating moral rules that can always be in 
agreement with our considered judgments and with moral facts. This sug-
gest, therefore, that deductive models tell us only one side of the story of 
our deliberative ability in ethics (and, at most, a fragment of how our moral 
sensibilities is made, but this is a different problem). 
Our deliberative ability is itself a fact that we cannot ignore. Throwing 
some new light on our ability could be possible questioning our old models, 
and trying to suggest new models, also to interpret some old questions. One 
of these, by way of example and suggestion, could be: how our values cross 
with each other? Since an adequate representation of our system of values 
                                                 
22 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953, par. 202. 
See also R. Arrington, A Wittgensteinian Approach to Ethical Intuitionism, in P. Strat-
ton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism. Re-evaluations, cit., pp. 271-289. 
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tends to be holistic - otherwise there would not be the presumption of co-
herence - the underlying assumption is that each of our value is connected 
with other values, although it might not be directly connected to each other 
. 
It may be possible to provide a representation of this provision by 
means of tools such as graph.23 The graph is a schematic structure that con-
nects points on space. It is a representation that has proven to be highly ef-
fective in complex phenomena such as ecological niches in food relations, 
air traffic, the distribution of wealth in national economies, the mapping of 
the internet, and so on. All of these are phenomena where individual events 
show varying degrees of connection with other events. There may be items 
that are highly related - codfish in the Benguela ecosystem in South Africa, 
the Atlanta airport in the system of world air traffic, the node on the inter-
net that was under the Twin Towers before September 11 - in a complex 
network. Within a complex network some objects are somehow privileged, 
since they have more connections than others - codfishes more than whales 
and dolphins, the hub of Atlanta more than the airport of Ronchi, the node 
of the Twin Tower more than that at the University of Trieste -. Having 
more connections means being connected to a larger number of other nodes. 
For this reason going from any point to any other inside a network of a cer-
tain kind - the so-called ‘small world’ networks - takes only a few steps (the 
number varies from three to nineteen, and expresses the degree of separa-
tion of the nodes between them). For this reason going from one web page 
to any other inside world wide web does not take an indefinite period of 
time, but just a few clicks of mouse. The amount of connections that the 
nodes have with other nodes is important to try to understand when a net-
work may collapse. This is a problem that we are about to understand par-
tially just now, although there are many cases that currently seem too 
complex – i.e. the case of the food chain in ecological niches.24 It would 
make sense to ask for ethical systems some of the questions we may ask for 
the air traffic system? Which nodes are more important than others? Which 
values develop more connections with other values? 
                                                 
23 A.-L. Barabási, Linked. The New Science of Networks, Plume, New York, 2003. 
24 The examples are from M. Buchanan, Nexus, The Grounbreaking Science of Networks, 
W. W. Norton & C., 2002. This text, like the one mentioned in the previous note, does 
not contain references to the possibility of describing our moral experience as a network 
(as that term is technically used by them). This is a surprising omission in texts some-
times perhaps too enthusiastic. 
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Thinking about our values as a network could throw new light on the 
problem of moral indeterminacy. The facts that appear to be more uncer-
tain from the point of view of ethics would be those that are on the periph-
ery of our moral map? Some of the phenomena that may be described as 
networks are highly structured and solid; in other words, it is not sufficient 
to bring about the collapse of nodes at random because the system tends to 
dissolve, since the nodes with the highest number of connections are those 
which can cause a plight. Does the same apply also within moral systems? 
Supposedly, in moral systems the peripheral nodes are those which are most 
exposed to superficial vulnerability, and those which are closer to the cen-
tral ones are the nodes which can cause the collapse of the system. This to-
pography could explain why moral dilemmas are not so frequent in every-
day life, after all, but when they occur they are able to short-circuit our 
moral system. 
How could a search of this kind be promising? It is obvious to say that 
there are conditions that favor the collapse of value systems. This collapse 
is much more likely to occur where the individual rather than the commu-
nity is involved. This assumption is rather easy to accept. Imagine being in 
a foreign country that has been invaded by your country and that you are 
in charge of the interrogation of hundreds of prisoners, without having re-
ceived adequate psychological training. This fact is a precondition of moral 
abuse, but if we add your lack of understanding of the language and local 
customs, then you will not be much surprised that your moral system can 
begin to collapse under an intolerable pressure (pressure that maybe you 
try to contain, hiding behind the formula of obedience to superior orders). 
If the individual had a clearer understanding of the values that constitute 
his main moral nodes and had been exercised to moral imagination, would 
he be able to resist to this pressure? We currently do not have clear and sys-
tematic answers to this and other questions involving the strength of our 
moral sensitivity to adverse conditions, but a representation of our moral 
world as governed by rules that constrain our considered judgments is inad-
equate, and suggests a revaluation of moral intuitions for a better under-
standing of our moral experience. 
 
